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EDUCATION LAW
D. Patrick Lacy, Jr. *
Kathleen S. Mehfoud **
I. CASE DECISIONS
In the past year, the most significant decisions affecting educa-
tion in Virginia were decided in the federal courts. Students and
parents challenged the practices of public education institutions
on a number of constitutional grounds, including the establish-
ment of religion, invasion of privacy rights, and violations of due
process and equal protection. The decisions that are likely to have
the greatest impact on school systems are discussed below.
A. Establishment Clause
Two cases arising out of Virginia addressed the impact of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on the activities of
public education institutions.1 In Brown v. Gilmore,2 several stu-
dents challenged Virginia's "moment of silence" law, which re-
quired a daily minute of silence in public school classrooms.3 The
stated purpose of the law is to provide each student with the op-
portunity to, "in the exercise of his or her individual choice, medi-
* Partner, Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, Virginia. A.B., 1966, Belmont Abbey College;
LL.B., 1969, University of Richmond.
** Partner, Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, Virginia. B.S., 1970, Mary Washington Col-
lege; M.C., 1974, University of Richmond; J.D., 1978, University of Richmond School of
Law.
The authors wish to thank Kelly C. Horan and Travis A. Sabalewski, associates in the
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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tate, pray, or engage in any silent activity which does not inter-
fere with, distract, or impede other pupils in the like exercise of
individual choice."4 The Fourth Circuit utilized the three-prong
Lemon test 5 to find the statute constitutional.'
In its holding, the court noted that a statute with a clearly
secular purpose can satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test de-
spite the presence of a religious purpose.7 It found that the lan-
guage of the moment of silence statute and its legislative history
demonstrated a clearly secular purpose-nonreligious medita-
tion.' Therefore, while one purpose of the law was secular,
namely the accommodation of religion,9 the court held that the
statute was facially neutral and therefore, it neither advanced
nor inhibited religion.1° The Fourth Circuit also rejected as
"speculative" the contention that the law would promote prayer
because of the impressionability of young children. The court
found no reason to presume that, by facilitating the moment of si-
lence, teachers would fail to follow the letter of the law and "in-
form the students of their statutory options .... "" Thus, the
third prong of the Lemon test, a lack of excessive entanglement,
was satisfied. 3
Finally, the' court distinguished the Virginia moment of silence
statute from a similar Alabama statute that was struck down by
the United States Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree."4 The
Wallace decision invalidated a one-minute moment of silence cre-
ated for Alabama school children to meditate or pray. 5 The Su-
4. Id. In apparent anticipation of a challenge to the statute, the General Assembly
provided that the Attorney General would defend any school board sued over the imple-
mentation of the moment of silence law. See id.
5. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon three-prong test is
commonly used by courts to determine Establishment Clause constitutionality. "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
,an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Id. at 610-13 (citations omitted).
6. Brown, 258 F.3d at 276.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 276-77.
11. Id. at 277-78.
12. Id. at 277.
13. Id. at 278.
14. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
15. Id. at 61.
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preme Court could not find any secular purpose on the part of the
Alabama lawmakers. 6 The Fourth Circuit distinguished the two
cases by pointing out that the Virginia statute had at least one
stated secular purpose, while the Alabama statute had none.17
Another moment of silence policy for students in the Common-
wealth did not fare as well in the courts. Mellen v. Bunting"8 in-
volved a challenge by two students of the Virginia Military Insti-
tute ("VMI"), a four-year state-operated military college where
prayers were offered every day at dinner. 9 The students argued
that this activity violated the Establishment Clause.2"
VMI uses the "adversative method" to teach students.2 As the
district court explained, the system "emphasizes physical rigor,
mental stress, absence of privacy, detailed regulation of behavior,
and indoctrination of a strict moral code," to prepare its gradu-
ates to be "citizen-soldiers."22 As part of its "supper roll call,"
members of the Corps of Cadets would march into the mess hall
and stand while a student read a prayer composed by the VMI
chaplain.23 The prayer would begin with "Almighty God" and
similar phrases, depending on the day of the week.24 The chaplain
would close the prayer with the language "Now 0 God, we receive
this food and share this meal together with thanksgiving.
Amen."25
VMI argued that the court should view the dinner prayer un-
der either: (1) the analysis employed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Marsh v. Chambers;26 or (2) as an academic free-
dom case under Keyishian v. Board of Regents.2 The court
16. Id. at 59.
17. Brown, 258 F.3d at 280.
18. 181 F. Supp. 2d 619 (W.D. Va. 2002).
19. Id. at 622.
20. The students also challenged the practice under Article I, § 16 of the Virginia Con-
stitution and the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Repl. Vol.
1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
21. Mellen, 181 F. Supp. at 622.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 623.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the practice by the Nebraska legislature to open
each day's session with a prayer).
27. 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (striking down a requirement that faculty members sign an
oath regarding personal involvement in Communist activities).
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rejected the invitation, holding that "the present case cannot be
subjected to a Marsh analysis, because public colleges and uni-
versities like VMI did not exist at the time the First Amendment
was drafted."2 The court further held that Keyishian was inappli-
cable because it does not stand for the proposition that a college's
right to academic freedom, assuming one exists, "should trump
the First Amendment rights of individual citizens."29
In its analysis, the court found VMI's practice of offering prayer
at dinner violated each prong of the Lemon test.3 ° It found that
VMI had not produced evidence of any legitimate secular pur-
pose.3 ' The court rejected VMI's arguments that the prayer was
generic and part of the educational mission of exposing cadets "to
an important means that many others use to deal with the spiri-
tual dimension."32
It observed that VMI failed to appreciate the "distinction of
constitutional importance between teaching about religion and
the practice of religion."33 Furthermore, the court similarly re-
jected VMI's rather tenuous assertion that the prayer solemnized
a public occasion, the supper roll call; and that the prayer, while
mandatory, simply accommodated the religious needs of the stu-
dents.34
The argument made by VMI regarding the effect of the prayer
was similarly rejected by the district court. 5 VMI attempted to
distinguish cases involving addressing prayer in public schools
from those involving colleges and universities based on the con-
cept of age.36 Specifically, VMI argued that differing constitu-
tional protections existed depending on the ages of the students.37
28. Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 625. In rejecting the Marsh analysis, the court could
have relied upon the fact that VMI had abandoned the dinner prayer when mandatory
chapel was dropped and that it did not resume until a short time before the suit was
brought.
29. Id. at 625-26.
30. See id. at 637.
31. Id. at 633.
32. Id. at 629 (alteration in original).
33. Id. at 630 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 630-31.
35. Id. at 636.
36. See id. at 634.
37. See id. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding prayer at high
school graduation unconstitutional), with Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding prayer at college graduation permissible).
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The court observed that prior decisions illustrate the necessity for
a case-by-case analysis, rather than the application of weaker
constitutional standards for college-aged students.3" The adversa-
tive methods employed by VMI led the court to conclude that the
practice of requiring prayer before dinner had the primary effect
of coercing the members of the Corps of Cadets to engage in reli-
gious activity. 9
In light of court rulings relating to the purpose and effect of the
prayer, the finding of excessive entanglement with religion was
predictable.4 ° After all, the prayers were written by the college
chaplain and were read at the direction of the college superinten-
dent.4
B. Privacy and FERPA42
The United States Supreme Court rendered a much anticipated
decision relating to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act ("FERPA")43 in Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo.
44
Teachers in the school district used the practice known as peer
grading in the classrooms, having their pupils grade each other's
homework and test papers and then call out the grades to the
teacher in class.45
Kristja Falvo, the mother of a partially mainstreamed disabled
student, objected to the practice because it embarrassed her chil-
dren to announce their grades in front of the other students.46
When the teachers refused to discontinue peer grading, Falvo
brought a class action suit against the school district. 47 Falvo
claimed that the practice of peer grading violated FERPA's prohi-
bition against any "'policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records ... of students without the written consent of
their parents.' 48
38. Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 634-35.
39. See id. at 636.
40. See id. at 636-37.
41. Id. at 637.
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
43. Id.
44. 122 S. Ct. 934 (2002).
45. Id. at 937.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000)).
20021
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The decision from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with Falvo 9 The court held that the "grades which students re-
cord on one another's homework and test papers and then report
to the teacher constitute 'education records' under FERPA." °
Since the students "maintained" the records for the teacher until
the grades could be recorded in the grade book, peer grading was
found to violate the statute. "'
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Tenth Circuit.52 Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy rejected
the proposition that students "maintained" the grades until the
teachers could record them in their grade books. 3 The Court
found the term "maintain" to suggest that records will be stored
in a secure cabinet or database.54 Kennedy's opinion observed
that "[i]t is fanciful to say [that students] maintain the papers in
the same way the registrar maintains a student's folder in a per-
manent file."55
The Court also disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's holding that
students who grade the papers of other students are to be consid-
ered "person[s] acting for" the school within the meaning of
FERPA.5" Absent more express language in the statute, the Court
was unwilling to conclude that Congress had intended "to inter-
vene in this drastic fashion with traditional state functions...
[and] exercise minute control over specific teaching methods and
instructional dynamics in classrooms throughout the country."57
The holding in Falvo raises the question of whether files kept
by teachers and other school employees must be placed in a se-
cure cabinet or database in order to be classified as "educational
49. Falvo v. Owasso, 233 F.3d 1203, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000).
50. Id. "Educational record" is defined as "those records, files, documents, and other
materials" containing "information directly related to a student and which are maintained
by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institu-
tion." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000).
51. Owasso, 233 F.3d at 1216.
52. Owasso, 122 S. Ct. at 935, 938.
53. Id. at 939. The Court did not decide whether a teacher's grade book is an "educa-
tion record" under FERPA. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 939; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii) (stating that one of the necessary
characteristics of "educational records" under FERPA is that they are maintained by per-
son's "acting for" an agency or institution).
57. Id. at 940.
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records" under FERPA.5" Such an interpretation substantially
curtails the reach of FERPA.
C. "Zero Tolerance"
Another "hotly contested" issue was addressed by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ratner v. Loudoun County Public
Schools. 9 This "zero tolerance" case arose after a classmate con-
fided in Benjamin Ratner ("Ratner"), an eighth grade public
school student, that she had suicidal thoughts and that she had
brought a knife to school.6" Ratner took the knife, and put it in his
locker without informing the school administration.6 He intended
to inform both his parents and the other student's parents about
the knife, but before he did so an assistant principal learned that
a classmate might have given Ratner the knife and questioned
him about the matter.62 Ratner admitted he had the knife and re-
trieved it at the direction of an administrator.6 ' The administra-
tor acknowledged that she thought Ratner acted in what he be-
lieved to be in the best interests of his classmate and that his
possession of the knife did not pose a threat to anyone.64
Nevertheless, Ratner was suspended for ten days65 under a pol-
icy which calls for expulsion from school, but permits a less se-
vere disciplinary action "as may be deemed appropriate."66 Sev-
eral days into the suspension, the superintendent of schools
notified Ratner that he was recommending that Ratner be sus-
pended for the remainder of the semester." The extended suspen-
sion was upheld at a subsequent administrative hearing and ap-
peal.68
58. See id. at 939.
59. No. 00-2157, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941 (4th Cir. July 30, 2001) (unpublished
decision). Under Fourth Circuit Rules, an unpublished opinion does not constitute binding
precedent in that circuit. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(c).
60. Ratner, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941, at *1.
61. Id. at *2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id. at *4 n.2 (quoting Ratner's description of the board policy in his original com-
plaint).
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id.
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Ratner brought suit against the administrators and school sys-
tem alleging violations of his due process and equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.69 He also' brought a claim for cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.7" In affirming the
dismissal of the case, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[h]owever
harsh the result in this case, the federal courts are not properly
called upon to judge the wisdom of a zero tolerance policy of the
sort alleged [by Ratner] ... or of its application to Ratner."71 The
court held that its role was limited to determining whether the
"complaint allege[d] sufficient facts which if proved would show
that the implementation of the school's policy in th[e] case failed
to comport with the United States Constitution."72 According to
the court, the school's policy was in fact constitutional. 3
The court accepted Ratner's description of the policy as one
"that precludes officials from considering the circumstances of a
particular case when meting out punishment."74 The Ratner case,
however, may not have presented a definitive test of zero toler-
ance policies because it is clear that the policy in question author-
ized administrators to impose a lesser disciplinary action when
appropriate. 7' The administrator therefore clearly acted within
the boundaries of his discretion in imposing a different penalty
from the one that was recommended for Ratner.76
D. Supervisory Liability of Administrators
In Baynard v. Malone,77 a student sought damages against a
school principal, the school system's personnel director, the
superintendent of schools, and the school board pursuant to 42
69. Id. at *3-4.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *6. The court affirmed dismissal of the case pursuant to FED. R. CiV. P.
12(b)(6).
72. Id. at *6.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *4 n.2.
75. See id.
76. But see M.M. v. Chesapeake City Sch. Bd., 52 Va. Cir. 356 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Chesa-
peake City). In M.M. the court rejected a student's challenge to his expulsion for multiple
threats of violence under the school system's mandatory expulsion policy holding that
"[m]andatory sentences for certain criminal offenses is a staple of the laws of the Com-
monwealth. A school board that adopts mandatory discipline actions based upon certain
offenses is likewise not acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner." Id. at 358.
77. 268 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001).
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perintendent of schools, and the school board pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.78 The suit alleged sexual molestation by a teacher.79
The teacher began molesting the student in the sixth grade and
did not stop until the student entered college."0 The abuse took
place within the school, before, during, and after school hours; on
camping trips; and at the teacher's home."1 Only after being told
by different individuals that the teacher had sexually molested
another student and was engaged in inappropriate conduct with
the plaintiff did the principal counsel the teacher to limit physical
contact with students.12 A few months later, the principal was in-
formed by another individual that the teacher had abused chil-
dren. 3 It was at this time that the principal advised the person-
nel director of the allegations. 4 The personnel director instructed
the principal to watch the teacher carefully and launched an in-
vestigation. 5
The investigation failed to result in charges by either the De-
partment of Child Protective Services or the police department. 6
The teacher resigned shortly thereafter. 7 The plaintiff was
awarded substantial damages against the defendants by the dis-
trict court.88 However, the court granted the motions of all the de-
fendants, except the principal, for judgment as a matter of law.8 9
A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to prove supervisory li-
ability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) the supervisor had actual or
constructive knowledge of conduct by a subordinate resulting in
an unreasonable risk of a constitutional injury to the plaintiff; (2)
the response to the knowledge constituted deliberate indifference;
78. Id. at 232. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
79. Baynard, 268 F.3d at 233.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 234.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 236-37.
2002]
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and (3) the deliberate indifference caused the plaintiff to suffer a
constitutional injury.9"
The Fourth Circuit concluded that sufficient evidence existed
from which a jury could conclude that the principal had construc-
tive knowledge of the teacher's abuse and that the principal's
"failure to respond to mounting evidence of potential misconduct
by Lawson [the teacher] exhibited deliberate indifference." 1
However, the court held that the personnel director acted
promptly and properly, launching an investigation upon learning
of the allegations regarding the teacher and instructing the prin-
cipal to closely monitor the teacher's actions.92 The superinten-
dent was also exonerated because he properly relied upon the
steps taken by the personnel director.9 3
The importance of this case lies in the court's treatment of the
Title IX claim. A school board is only liable under Title IX for its
own misconduct or that of an official who has the authority to ad-
dress the discrimination and to institute corrective action on be-
half of the board.94 Despite finding against the principal on the
§ 1983 supervisory liability claim, the court held that a jury could
not reasonably conclude the principal had actual knowledge of
the abuse. 95 More importantly, the court did not consider the
principal an official with authority to institute corrective action
on behalf of the school board. 6 While recognizing that a principal
exercises broad powers over the school to which he or she is as-
signed.97 A principal does not possess the authority under state
law to suspend, transfer, or fire teachers.9" The court found that
these powers were necessary to act on behalf of the school board.99
Consequently, it would appear that under the Baynard decision,
the deliberate indifference of a principal does not give rise to li-
ability of a school board under Title IX.
90. Id. at 235 (citing Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).
91. Id. at 236.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 237.
94. Id. at 238. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999).
95. Baynard, 268 F.3d at 238.
96. Id. at 238-39.
97. The court listed the supervision of teachers and transfer and dismissal recom-
mendations as examples of this broad power. Id.
98. Id. at 239.
99. Id.
[Vol. 37:89
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E. Arbitration
The enforceability of an arbitration clause against a school
board was at issue in Russell County School Board v. Conseco Life
Insurance Co.' °° The school board filed suit in state court against
the insurance company for failing to reimburse certain medical
expenses." 1 The insurance company removed the case to federal
court and filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to compel arbi-
tration pursuant to a clause in the contract between the company
and the school board. °2 The clause required arbitration of all dis-
putes between the parties to be conducted in Chicago, the location
of the company's home office.'
The school board argued that under the holding in W.M.
Schlosser v. School Board of Fairfax County,'°4 it was ultra vires
for a Virginia school board to enter into an arbitration agree-
ment.' O5 However, after the holding in W.M. Schlosser, the Gen-
eral Assembly amended the Virginia Public Procurement Act 0 6 to
expressly authorize school boards to enter into arbitration agree-
ments."7 While any such arbitration is nonbinding, 0 8 the court
rejected the school board's contention that nonbinding arbitration
is unenforceable.0 9 The court also did not agree that the board
should not be required to participate in an arbitration in Chicago
due to financial difficulties confronted by the school district."
The court said that the school board failed to provide evidence as
to why it was unable to pay the costs associated with the arbitra-
tion in Chicago."' Consequently, the school board was ordered to
participate in the arbitration in Chicago."'
100. No. 1:01CV00131, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20691 (W.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2001) (unpub-
lished decision).
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id. at *2-3.
103. Id. at *2.
104. 980 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a school board had no authority under
Virginia law to arbitrate contract disputes).
105. Russell County Sch. Bd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20691, at *3.
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4300 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
107. Id. § 2.2-4366 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
108. Id.
109. Russell County Sch. Bd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20691, at *12.
110. Id. at *11-12.
111. Id. at *12.
112. Id.
20021
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F. Compliance with IDEA..3
In the past year, there have been few statutory and regulatory
changes in the area of special education law. A period of regula-
tory quietude was expected following the changes that occurred
with the 1997 reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"),"' the 1999 revision of the federal regula-
tions,"5 and the issuance of Virginia's revised state regulations in
2001.116
The IDEA statutes and supporting federal regulations have
remained unchanged this year. The cases that were decided pri-
marily dealt with the issue of tuition reimbursement and proce-
dural compliance. It can be expected that next year will provide
many new legal considerations as the IDEA is scheduled for reau-
thorization.
The following cases demonstrate the importance placed by the
courts on substantial compliance with the complicated procedures
of the IDEA. These cases show that a school division's significant
lapse in compliance with IDEA's procedures may result in liabil-
ity for tuition reimbursement. Similarly, parents may be barred
from recovering tuition reimbursement for the private placements
they make without school division participation if they fail to
comply with the notice procedures of the IDEA prior to making
the placement. Despite the lack of statutory and regulatory de-
velopment, some significant cases demonstrate that school divi-
sions have a responsibility for notifying parents of the specifics of
IDEA's procedures.
1. Tuition Reimbursement
In Faulders v. Henrico County School Board,'17 parents dis-
agreed with the school division's proposal for extended school
year services and provided those services to the child at their own
113. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000).
114. Id.
115. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.197 (2001).
116. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-10 (2002).
117. 190 F. Supp. 2d 849 (E.D. Va. 2002), appeal filed, No. 02-1418 (4th Cir. Apr. 22,
2002).
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expense.118 The parents then sought reimbursement for those ser-
vices through administrative proceedings.1 9 The hearing officer
found that the school division should have provided the level of
services requested by the parents, yet also found that reim-
bursement was not required for the services the parents had pro-
vided and paid for themselves. 12' The hearing officer explained
that "a goal of 'reasonable progress' over the summer months was
acceptable and that 'mastery' of skills was not required." ' The
parents subsequently brought suit under the IDEA. 122
The district court granted summary judgment for the school di-
vision on appeal, finding that any delay by Henrico County in de-
veloping the extended school year Individual Education Program
("IEP") did not prejudice the parents, because they had the option
of making their own placement and seeking reimbursement.
1 23
The court also criticized the hearing officer's reliance on testi-
mony of expert witnesses who had not observed the child in
school, finding that he ignored the testimony of school division
witnesses with first hand knowledge of the child in the school en-
vironment. 24 Finally, the court found that an IEP which was de-
signed to achieve "reasonable progress" in the summer months as
opposed to "mastery," was sufficient. 25 The court held that the
IDEA and supporting regulations do not require the school divi-
sion to maximize a child's education.1 26
This case provides some insight into the standard by which ex-
tended school year services will be judged by the courts. These
services are not required to be written into the IEP at a level
which will provide the student with the same opportunity for
mastery of goals as is required during the school year. Further-
more, the case clearly calls into question the feasibility of employ-
ing experts who have had little or no contact with the student in
118. See id. at 850-52.
119. Id. at 852.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 854 ("In making his decision, the Hearing Officer placed too much, if not ex-
clusive, reliance on the expert testimony, and failed to give appropriate consideration to
the basis for each witness' opinion.").
125. Id.
126. Id. at 853 (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1001 (4th
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)).
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the school setting. Their opinions will not be afforded the same
weight as the school division experts who work with the student
on a daily basis. This ruling underscores a tendency on the part of
the courts to give deference to the opinions of those professionals
who actually work with the student.
The Virginia Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of tui-
tion reimbursement in White v. Henrico County School Board.'27
In White, the parents unilaterally removed their child from public
school and placed him in a private school for learning disabled
students for the school year. 2 ' Prior to his removal, the parents
had reviewed and agreed to the child's IEP for that year.'29 A year
later, the parents requested a due process hearing in which they
sought reimbursement for the private school tuition payments for
the previous and future school years. 30
Henrico County initiated a full evaluation of the child after re-
ceiving the hearing request and developed an IEP for him after
school started.' 3' No teacher from the private school attended the
IEP meeting.'32 The school division did have information from the
private school for its review.'33 The information showed that the
child had actually regressed during his year of placement in the
private school.' 34 During the administrative proceedings, the local
hearing officer found for the school division, but the state review
officer reversed the decision and found for the parents.3 ' The
school district then challenged this ruling in the circuit court. 36
The circuit court found in favor of the school division, and the
parents appealed.'37
In its analysis of the case, the Virginia Court of Appeals first
reviewed the parents' argument that the circuit court did not
conduct an appropriate review of the case. 138 The court of appeals
127. 36 Va. App. 137, 549 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 2001).
128. See id. at 149, 549 S.E.2d at 22.
129. Id. at 147-49, 549 S.E.2d at 21-22.
130. Id. at 149, 549 S.E.2d at 22.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 149-50, 549 S.E.2d at 22.
134. Id. at 150, 549 S.E.2d at 22.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 151, 549 S.E.2d at 22.
137. Id. at 151, 549 S.E.2d at 23.
138. Id. at 151-52, 549 S.E.2d at 23.
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found that the circuit court was not required to state its reasons
for rejecting the state review officer's decision, even though that
was the standard established by federal case law.139
The appellate court then found that the procedural violations
were not significant "because any procedural inadequacies in this
case did not hamper the [parent's] opportunity to participate in
the development of [the child's] IEP and did not result in a loss of
an educational opportunity or benefit.... "14 0 The court also held
that the mother's absence from the IEP meeting was not a fatal
procedural violation because she agreed for the meeting to pro-
ceed without her.141 Further, she had an opportunity to partici-
pate in its development. 42 The court went on to note that the de-
lay in holding the IEP meeting for the next school year and the
absence of the private school teacher from the IEP meeting were
not significant procedural violations because they did not deny a
free appropriate public education.143 Finally, the court reaffirmed
the appropriateness of constructing draft IEPs for discussion at
IEP meetings.4
This case is significant because it demonstrates that while the
IDEA's procedures are important, the failure to follow the proce-
dures will not automatically result in a finding that the IEP was
inappropriate or that tuition reimbursement must be awarded.
Procedural violations will only be found to have invalidated the
IEP if those violations were so serious that they resulted in a de-
nial of a free appropriate public education.
The case also underscores that different case law will be ap-
plied depending on whether the IDEA appeal is brought in state
or federal court. Federal case law would have required the circuit
court to state with specificity and in writing its reasons for reject-
ing the review officer's findings, while Virginia case law provides
no similar requirement.145 The court found that the standard of
review under the IDEA espoused through federal court decisions,
139. Id. at 152-53, 549 S.E.2d at 23.
140. Id. at 154, 549 S.E.2d at 23.
141. Id. at 156, 549 S.E.2d at 25.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 156-57, 549 S.E.2d at 26.
144. Id. at 159-60, 549 S.E.2d at 27.
145. See, e.g., Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1992).
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while persuasive, was not binding in state court appeals. 46 This
decision creates an additional factor for parties to consider when
deciding whether to appeal adverse administrative proceedings in
state or federal court.
2. Notification Requirements Under IDEA
a. Parental Rights
The effect of the failure to notify parents of their IDEA rights
was addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Jaynes v. Newport News
School Board.'47 The Jaynes case involved a preschool autistic
child whose parents unilaterally removed him from public school
and provided education services to him using the educational
methodology known as Applied Behavioral Analysis Therapy
("ABA").' 48 The school division originally delayed in offering a
special education program to the child and did not involve the
parents in the initial IEP meeting.'49 Furthermore, the IEP was
not implemented for several months.50
In the fall of 1994 another IEP was drafted and the parents
signed consent for implementation.' 5 ' Both IEPs contained lan-
guage above the parents' signatures that stated the parents had
received a copy of procedural safeguards.'52 These safeguards no-
tify parents of their rights, including the ability to request a due
process hearing if there is any disagreement over the IEP.'5 '
The parents removed the child from the public school program
in January 1995 and began providing the ABA program at
home. 54 They initiated a hearing in January 1997.' When the
school division defended the claim by arguing that the statute of
146. White, 36 Va. App. at 152, 549 S.E.2d at 23.
147. Nos. 00-2312, 00-2575, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15580, at *1 (4th Cir. July 10, 2001)
(unpublished decision).
148. Id. at *4.
149. Id. at *3.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *3-4.
155. Id. at *4.
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limitations barred the administrative proceedings, the parents al-
leged that they did not in fact receive their procedural safeguards
and asked that the statute of limitations be tolled.'56
Both the local hearing officer and the state review officer found
for the parents.157 However, the state review officer reduced the
overall reimbursement amount to those expenses incurred on and
after the date that the parents requested the due process hear-
ing."'8 Part of the rationale for this decision was a finding by the
review officer that the parents had actually received the proce-
dural safeguards."'
The parents appealed the decision to the district court, seeking
reimbursement dating back to January 1995 for the ABA ser-
vices. '0 The district court granted summary judgment for the
parents and awarded reimbursement from July 1, 1995.61 The
court found evidence of failures by the school division to comply
with the IDEA's procedures and a failure to notify the parents of
their right to initiate a due process hearing.162
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. 163 The
court found that the statute of limitations for cases under the
IDEA is one year for causes of action accruing prior to July 1,
1995, and two years for causes of action arising on or after that
date.' The court discounted the school division's argument that
the parents' cause of action arose in October 1994 when the last
IEP meeting was held or, at the latest, in January 1995 when the
parents removed the child from public school. 65
The Fourth Circuit opined that the real injury in this case was
the school division's failure to notify the parents of their right to
156. See id. at *4. The statute of limitations was one year for causes of action accruing
before July 1, 1995 and two years for causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1995. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
157. Jaynes, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15580, at *4.
158. See id. at *5.
159. See id. at *3.
160. Id. at *5.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *6.
164. Id. (citing Manning v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 176 F.3d 235, 239 n.2 (4th Cir.
1999)).
165. See id. at *7-8.
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request a due process hearing.166 The court noted that "[it follows
that the moment [the parents] learned they had a right to a hear-
ing was the moment they learned Newport had a duty to inform
them of such a right.""6 7 The parents' factual contention that they
were not aware of their rights until late in 1996 was affirmed. 6 '
The Fourth Circuit also noted that the local hearing officer's find-
ings of fact should generally prevail over those of the state review
officer if the two are in conflict over matters of witness credibil-
ity.16
9
The Jaynes case illustrates that school boards have an obliga-
tion to notify parents of their rights under the IDEA. This case
also underscores the importance of the need to document the pro-
vision of procedural safeguards to parents. Documentation of the
provision of rights is critical to the imposition of a time limitation.
One method of documentation is to have the parents sign and
date an actual copy of the procedural safeguards, provide them
with the copy, and maintain the signed document in the student's
file. This. approach is not entirely feasible because the procedural
safeguards are twenty-five pages long. An alternative approach
would be to include an additional provision for the parents to sign
with the written acknowledgement in the IEP. The provision
could require parents to acknowledge awareness of their right to
initiate a due process hearing if they have a disagreement over
identification, evaluation, placement, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education.
b. Parental Rejection of the IEP
The importance of compliance with procedures also arose in
Pollowitz v. Weast.17° Unlike the Jaynes case, the Pollowitz deci-
sion penalized the parents because they failed to follow IDEA's
procedures. In Pollowitz, the parents did not notify the school di-
vision within ten business days regarding their intent to reject
166. Id. at *8.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *9 (citing Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.
1992); Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir. 1998)).
170. No. 00-1690, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 6729 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2001) (unpublished
decision).
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the proposed IEP program and to unilaterally place their child in
private school.171
The parents attended an IEP meeting for the 1998-99 school
year on March 23, 1998 and agreed to that IEP.'72 Without telling
the school division, the parents then sought enrollment for the
child at a private school and paid the initial deposit on June 2,
1998.173 The parents' attorney subsequently sent a letter to the
school division on June 29, 1998 indicating that the parents in-
tended to place the child privately and requesting that the school
division support that placement.'74 A subsequent IEP meeting
was conducted and the school division once again proposed public
placement. 175 The parents then requested a due process hearing
to seek reimbursement. 176
The school district sought to dismiss the matter because the
parents had failed to provide appropriate notice of their rejection
of the IEP.177 The administrative law judge dismissed the case
and, on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment for
the school district. 178 The district court found that the attorney's
letter provided insufficient notice to the school district because it
did not reject the proposed IEP and because it did not provide the
required notice.179 The letter from the attorney was sent after the
child was already enrolled in the private placement.
1 80
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's rul-
ing that the parents failed to provide proper and timely notice of
the rejection of the IEP prior to removing their child from public
school and that this served as a bar to their claim for reimburse-
ment."1 The court further held that the school district could bar
reimbursement without showing that the letter's inadequacies
prejudiced the school division.8 2 It was sufficient for the school
district to prove that the required notice was not given.8 3
171. See id. at *10-11.
172. Id. at *5.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *6.
175. Id. at *7.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at *7-8.
179. See id. at *8-9.
180. Id. at *11.
181. See id. at *16-17.
182. Id. at *13-14.
183. Id.
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This holding is significant because it illustrates how important
it is for parents to follow the notice requirements of the IDEA if
they expect to recover tuition reimbursement. The requirement
that notice must be given ten business days prior to removal was
added to the IDEA to allow schools to have time to satisfy the
parents' concerns and, hopefully, avoid the need for the private
school placement. 184 Consequently, the holding is not surprising.
Without this notice, hearings could be initiated without first hav-
ing the claims properly presented to the school division.
Special education law has had a quiet year with the exception
of some significant case decisions. Those decisions make clear
that parents must be informed of their rights under the IDEA
and must be given notice of their procedural safeguards. School
divisions must be in a position to prove that these rights were
provided in order to assert a statute of limitations defense. Fur-
thermore, school divisions must comply with IDEA procedures or
risk having the IEPs which they develop invalidated. Nonethe-
less, minor procedural violations which do not result in a denial of
a free appropriate public education will be given little credence by
the courts. Parents must also be mindful of compliance with pro-
cedures if they are seeking reimbursement for a private school
placement in which they have placed their child. It is likely that
there will be many new issues raised after the reauthorization of
the IDEA in 2002.
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CHANGES
A. Federal
The most significant legislative development impacting public
education in Virginia and the nation is the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 (the "Act"),' which was signed into law on January
8, 2002. The Act, which amended Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965,186 has as its stated purpose "to
ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant oppor-
tunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a mini-
184. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (2000).
185. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
186. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (2000).
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mum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement
standards and state academic assessments."187 It is beyond the
scope of this article to discuss the many aspects of this complex
legislation. However, the Act does contain some provisions which,
depending on their interpretation and application, may bring it
squarely in conflict with the Virginia Constitution.
The Act, among other things, requires a state to develop stan-
dards and to measure progress toward achieving those standards
in order to ensure proficiency of all students in the areas of read-
ing/language arts, mathematics, and science. 188 The state is also
required to develop an accountability system containing rewards
and sanctions for both local school divisions and schools based on
their progress in meeting interim targets and the ultimate profi-
ciency goal."8 9 The sanctions that the Act permits-and in some
situations requires-a state to impose on school divisions, include
the following: (1) permitting students to transfer to a school in
another school division; (2) instituting new curricula; (3) replac-
ing school division personnel; (4) removing a school from the ju-
risdiction of the school board; (5) appointing a trustee or receiver
to run the division; and (6) abolishing or restructuring the divi-
sion. '9
Depending on whether and how some of these sanctions are
administered, they could bring the state into conflict with the re-
quirement in the Virginia Constitution that "[t]he supervision of
schools in each school division shall be vested in a school
board." 9' This is especially true in light of the broad construction
placed upon that provision by previous court decisions.'92 What-
ever else is certain, the Virginia Constitution requires that a
school board, and not a third party, supervise the schools in the
187. No Child Left Behind Act § 1001, 115 Stat. at 1439.
188. See id. § 1111(b), 115 Stat. at 1445.
189. See id. §§ 1111, 1116, 115 Stat. at 1444-62, 1478.
190. Id. § 1116(b)(7)(C), 115 Stat. at 1484.
191. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
192. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1067 (4th Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S.
92 (1973) (holding that the State Board of Education, acting alone, cannot consolidate
school divisions); Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 452, 106 S.E.2d 636, 646 (1959) (declaring
the massive resistance law authorizing the closing of schools and the vesting of control
over schools in the Governor violative of VA. CONST. § 133, now VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7).
But see De Febio v. County Sch. Bd., 199 Va. 511, 513, 100 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1957), appeal
dismissed, 357 U.S. 218 (1958) ("The general power to supervise does not necessarily in-
clude the right to designate the individuals over whom supervision is to be exercised.").
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division.'93 Consequently, conflict may be inevitable. In addition,
the Act leaves unanswered a myriad of questions, including
whether tuition will be charged for students transferring from
one division to another and, if so, by whom.1 94 These and other
questions will cause the state and local school boards to grapple
with the implementation of the Act in the future.
B. State
The Virginia General Assembly enacted several education bills
of particular interest to public schools. School boards are now re-
quired to "prominently" post the statement: "'In God We Trust,'
the National Motto, enacted by Congress in 1956" in a "conspicu-
ous" place in each school, but not necessarily in each classroom.1 95
School boards may accept in-kind or cash contributions to assist it
in meeting this new mandate.'96
Another noteworthy piece of legislation is an amendment of
Virginia Code section 22.1-60 to prohibit school boards from rene-
gotiating a superintendent's contract during the period following
the election or appointment of new school board members, and
when those new members are qualified to take office.'97 The
amendment does not prohibit the appointment of, or contract ne-
gotiation with, a new superintendent during that period.' Nor
does it prohibit the reappointment of and renegotiation of a con-
tract with a sitting superintendent prior to an election, even
though the reappointment and contract will not become effective
until after the election.'99 This bill was introduced in reaction to a
contract amendment and buyout of a superintendent by an outgo-
ing school board, thus affirming the old adage that bad facts
make bad law.
193. See Sch. Bd. v. Parham, 218 Va. 950, 958-59, 243 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1978) (holding
the school board's delegation of a State Board of Education grievance procedure to a fact-
finding panel to be unconstitutional).
194. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-5 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
195. Id. § 22.1-1 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (editor's note).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 22.1-60 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
198. Id.
199. See id.
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In a significant step towards total autonomy for elected school
boards, Virginia Code section 22.1-32 was also amended to au-
thorize elected school boards to pay their members an annual sal-
ary that is consistent with the salary procedures. 200 The salary
must be within the limits provided for county boards of supervi-
sors in Title 15.2 or for cities in their charters. 21 This eliminates
the need for a school board to have a bill introduced in the Gen-
eral Assembly to increase the salary limits for its members.
The General Assembly also made changes to school budgetary
procedures. One bill amended Virginia Code section 22.1-115 to
create a new major classification of contingency reserves for
budget purposes.20 2 This action may be more symbolic than sub-
stantive, because many school boards already include a contin-
gency reserve in their budgets and any unexpended contingency
reserve funds will revert at the end of fiscal year, the same as any
other fund balance. Moreover, this new law does not mandate the
appropriating body to fund such a reserve.2 3 Finally, this year
the General Assembly granted school boards the power to accept
credit or debit card payments and to add a service charge for ac-
cepting this means of payment.20 4
One of the most noteworthy legislative actions was the
amendment of the charter school law, Virginia Code section 22.1-
212.6 to -212.15, to mandate that school boards accept charter
school applications. 20 5 The scope of the legislation may be limited,
however, because school boards retain the discretion to refuse to
grant a charter to applicants.2 6 The General Assembly explicitly
rejected further reaching legislation that would have made virtu-
ally every decision of a school board related to charter schools
subject to judicial review.0 7 This legislation also would have re-
200. Id. § 22.1-32 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
201. See id.
202. Id. § 22.1-115 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
203. See id.
204. Id. § 22.1-116.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
205. Id. §§ 22.1-212.6 to -212.9, -212-11, -212.12, -212.14, -212.15 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
206. Id.
207. See H.B. 734, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 17,
2002, ch. 874, 2002 Va. Acts 714); S.B. 625, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted
as Act of Apr. 17, 2002, ch. 851, 2002 Va. Acts 600). The bills were changed by an amend-
ment in nature of a substitute. The House Committee on Education enacted the amend-
ment on Feb. 6, 2002 and the Senate Committee on Education and Health made a similar
amendment on Feb. 12, 2002.
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quired school boards to give charter schools the entire federal,
state, and local per pupil funding received by the school board.
08
Consequently, the amount of funding remains a matter to be ne-
gotiated between the charter school applicant and the school
board." 9
It is also important to note that students and employees were
not forgotten by the General Assembly during the 2002 session.
In response to the sale of student information for commercial
purposes, Virginia Code section 22.1-79.3 was amended to require
school boards to develop policies to prohibit the administration of
student questionnaires and surveys during the regular school day
or at school-sponsored events.210 The Code now requires parental
consent if the questionnaire or survey may result in the sale of
student information for commercial purposes.211
School personnel also are now prohibited from recommending
that students use "psychotropic medications."21 2 However, they
are not prohibited from recommending that students be evaluated
by a healthcare provider, or from consulting with the provider
with the parent's consent.213 In addition, students must now be
taught the "benefits of adoption as a positive choice in the event
of an unwanted pregnancy" as part of the family life curricu-
lum.
214
The General Assembly also addressed the issue of teacher em-
ployment in 2002. It amended Virginia Code section 22.1-304(f) to
require school boards to notify teachers of a reduction in force due
to a decrease in the proposed school board budget.2 1 ' This notifi-
cation must occur within two weeks of the approval of the budget
by the appropriating body or by June 1, whichever is earlier. 6
This amendment presents difficulties, however, because Vir-
ginia Code section 22.1-93 requires the appropriating bodies to
approve the school board budget in May "or within thirty days of
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-79.3 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
211. Id.
212. Id. § 22.1-274.3 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 22.1-207.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
215. Id. § 22.1-304(F) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
216. Id.
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the receipt by [the appropriating body] of the estimates of state
funds, whichever shall later occur."217 In addition, funds are not
available for use by the school board until they are appropriated,
and the appropriating body can make appropriations as infre-
quently as it appropriates funds to its own departments.218 More-
over, a school board is prohibited from expending or contracting
to expend funds beyond those made available to it without the
consent of the appropriating body,219 and nothing in a teacher's
continuing contract authorizes the school board to be bound be-
yond the period for which funds have been made available. 20 The
General Assembly may therefore have inserted greater confusion
into the network of laws regarding teacher employment and com-
pensation.
There have been a few state statutory changes made regarding
special education law in the past year. One change was made in
Virginia Code section 22.1-215.1 to require the State Board of
Education to "publicize and disseminate" information regarding
"current federal law and regulation addressing procedures and
rights related to the placement and withdrawal of children in
special education."22 This information must be provided to par-
ents of children who are currently placed in special education
programs or who have been recommended for those programs.222
The statute appears designed to insure that parents of children
with disabilities are aware of their rights under the IDEA. This
theme of insuring that parents are aware of their rights is one
that is frequently repeated in case decisions and statutory provi-
sions.
Another statutory revision affects the expulsion of students
from public schools. 23 The new provision requires consideration
of the results of special education assessments when making an
expulsion decision, except when the basis for the discipline falls
within the firearm and drug offenses specified in Virginia Code
217. Id. § 22.1-93 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
218. Id. § 22.1-94 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
219. Id. § 22.1-91 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
220. Id. § 22.1-304(D) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
221. Id. § 22.1-215.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
222. Id.
223. See id. § 22.1-277.06 (Cum. Supp. 2002). This code section demonstrates an in-
creased consideration of the needs of special education students in making disciplinary
decisions.
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sections 22.1-277.07 and 22.1-277.08.224 There is, however, lan-
guage which provides that "[nio decision to expel a student shall
be reversed on the grounds that such factors were not consid-
ered."22
5
The Virginia regulations regarding special education were sub-
stantially rewritten in January 2001 and minimal revisions oc-
curred this year. The changes to the state regulations were
mostly technical in nature and were required by the United
States Department of Education to bring Virginia's regulations
into compliance with federal regulations. 226 The revised Virginia
regulations became effective on March 27, 2002.227
One amendment to the state regulations required the State
Education Advisory Committee to publicly announce its meeting
and agenda items "enough in advance of the meeting to afford in-
terested parties a reasonable opportunity to attend. ' 22' There is
also a requirement that these meetings be open to the public.229
The former regulatory language only required that notice of these
items be given "prior to" the meeting.23 ° It appears that the intent
of the change is to promote participation by the public in the ad-
visory meetings.
Language was also added to the Virginia Administrative Code
regarding the reporting provisions for state and local assessment
programs.231 The test reports must incorporate the results for
students with disabilities "if doing so would be statistically sound
and would not result in the disclosure of performance results
identifiable to individual children."232 This language brings the
state into conformity with federal requirements and furthers the
goal of including children with disabilities in assessment pro-
grams.
224. Id. § 22.1-277.07, -277.08 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
225. Id. § 22.1-277.06 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
226. Regulations Governing Special Education Programs for Children with Disabilities
in Virginia, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. 1657 (Feb. 25, 2002) (to be codified at 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE §
20-80).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1659.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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The revised state regulations also altered the administrative
code section regarding the "responsibility of local school divisions
and state-operated programs"233 as it applies to non-educational
placements made under the Virginia Comprehensive Services
Act.2"4 The regulations previously required local school divisions
to ensure the availability of, "to the extent reasonable, a free ap-
propriate public education" for disabled children placed in private
schools for non-educational reasons via the Comprehensive Ser-
vices Act.2 5 The concern had been that a child placed in private
day or residential placement for non-educational reasons might
be placed in a setting that did not meet the least restrictive envi-
ronment requirements associated with a free appropriate public
education. 236 The regulatory amendment now requires the local
school division to develop an IEP "appropriate for the child's
needs while the child is in the residential placement."237 The prior
language appeared to limit the rights of children with disabilities
to receive a free appropriate public education.2 " The new lan-
guage clarifies that, even when the impetus for the placement is
not educational, a child is still entitled to a free appropriate pub-
lic education. An additional amendment also makes it clear that
the parents of children placed through the Comprehensive Ser-
vices Act retain their right to participate in IEP and placement
decisions unless they choose not to participate.239
One of the major changes in this set of regulatory amendments
occurred in the section addressing the free appropriate public
education ("FAPE") requirements.24 ° Under the section entitled
"Age of Eligibility," the regulatory language was changed to re-
flect that it is a goal for special education services to be available
to disabled children from birth through age twenty-one by the
year 2010.241 Currently, services in Virginia are required for chil-
233. Id. at 1660.
234. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-5200 to -5214 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
235. Regulations Governing Special Education Programs for Children with Disabilities
in Virginia, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. at 1660.
236. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-64 (2002) (providing a list of the least restrictive envi-
ronment requirements).
237. Regulations Governing Special Education Programs for Children with Disabilities
in Virginia, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. at 1660.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 1672.
240. Id. at 1666.
241. Id.
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dren ages two through twenty-one, and in the federal regulations
they are required for children ages three through twenty-one.242
Finally, the provisions of the due process hearing section 243
were amended to provide that the twenty business day timeline
for decisions in expedited due process hearings applies regardless
of whether the parents or the school division requests the hear-
ing.244 The regulation also inserted specific language to clarify
that an appeal of any hearing officer's decision can be made to ei-
ther a state circuit court or a federal court within one year of the
decision.245 Previously the regulations only referred to appeals to
state courts.246
III. CONCLUSION
In comparison to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the
other developments in education law this past year were rela-
tively insignificant and, to a great extent, predictable. Without a
doubt, the interpretation and implementation of the Act will
spawn litigation and legislation on the state level for years to
come. There were few developments in the area of special educa-
tion law, with the exception of case decisions regarding compli-
ance with IDEA's procedures and tuition reimbursement. It can
be expected that the imminent reauthorization of the IDEA will
result in significant changes in the next year.
242. See id., 34 C.F.R. § 300.121(a)(2001).
243. Regulations Governing Special Education Programs for Children with Disabilities
in Virginia, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. at 1676.
244. Id. at 1681.
245. Id. at 1682.
246. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-76(O)(1) (2002).
[Vol. 37:89
